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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has a decade’s old history, but it only turned into the EU that we know today on 
the 7th of February 1992, following the Treaty on European Union (europa.eu 2010a ), or Maastricht Treaty 
as it is colloquially known. Much like the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon of the 13th of December 
2007 marks major changes within the European Union, and is also the most recent addition to the EU 
structure (europa.eu 2010b). The EU, while initially a disarmament, resource integration and resource 
management organization, has since then turned into an economic and political union. This union, the EU, 
also gained certain foreign policy elements. These elements have been in use through the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) whose aim is to carry out the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) (eeas.eu) both in times of peace and in times of crisis and conflict. 
Conflict is something that has marked Ukraine for decades in one form or another: From its absorption into 
the Soviet Union, through the most destructive war in the history of mankind, the Second World War, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and into an uncertain time of independence. As it stands, the current issues in 
Ukraine is not the first time civilian political movements have acted. Under the Orange Revolution of 2004, 
the people of Ukraine stood against a fraudulent presidential election, and ended up overturning the vote 
(Karatnycky 2005: 8). As is now apparent, the Ukrainian civil population did not hesitate to move against 
what they perceived to be a corrupt regime, ending in the exile of the then incumbent president 
Yanukovych. As with the end of the Orange Revolution, this was not the end of the issues facing this new 
state (Motyl 2010: 37 and Motyl 2013a). 
In regards to Ukraine, Russia has always been a factor. Not only was Russia the heart of the Soviet Union, 
and as such Ukraine and its people had previously lived under Moscow rule for decades, but it still wields a 
degree of influence over present day Ukraine. Political commentators talk about a possible Eurasian system 
with the Ukraine being a part of, but under Russia (Beisswenger 2007: 47). Much the same is described, 
albeit in less of a hypothetical or theoretical suggestion, stating that Russia’s current foreign policy is 
meddling and supporting anti-democratic groups in the former satellite states of the Soviet Union 
(Velychenko 2007: pp. 20-21). The same sentiment and more is propagated in other places, commenting on 
how Russia tries to influence its neighbors, shaping them like Russia itself has been shaped (Wilson 2014: 
pp. 34-35). This influencing and shaping of countries around it, specifically mentioned is Georgia by 
Tymoshenko (Tymoshenko 2007: 22), has also now occurred in very overtly in Ukraine.  
These different elements all come together in the current conflict in Ukraine, where actors are not only 
Ukraine and the separatists it is fighting against, but also the EU and Russia. This conflict seems to have 
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many facets, and power and influence seems to be wielded in different manners within a crisis that has 
become a melting pot for the influence of European actors. There seems to be a clearly demarcated line, 
with the EU on one side, and by extension the West, and Russia on the other, both trying to shape the 
conflict in Ukraine to best suit their view and wishes of European power and influence (Orenstein 2014: 
109).  
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This paper will take its point of departure in the crisis that has occurred in Ukraine following the 
Euromaidan. It will deal with the different actors involved, primarily the European Union and the Russian 
Federation. This paper will elucidate the conflict and how these relevant actors have interacted in the 
Ukrainian Crisis.  
Problem statement 
How has the European Union affected the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, and has its agenda 
been successful?   
Underlying hypothesis 
The differences in types of society, has created a conflict where attempts by the European Union to 
influence the Russian Federation, has failed in the short to medium term. 
Working questions/steps 
How has the European Union and the Russian Federation been involved in the crisis in Ukraine? 
Step 1: What is the background for the crisis in Ukraine? 
Step 2: How has the European Union and the Russian Federation acted during the crisis in Ukraine? 
How does English School account for the actions of the European Union in the Ukrainian crisis? 
Step 1:  What do the actions of the European Union and the Russian Federation indicate about their 
respective types of societies, institutions and values?  
Step 2: What does the respective types of societal archetypes of the European Union and the Russian 
Federation mean for their interaction and agendas? 
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Abbreviations 
 
CFSP  – Common Foreign Security Policy 
EEAS  – European External Action Service 
EU  – the European Union 
NATO  – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OSCE   – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
TCG  – Trilateral Contact Group 
TFEU  – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
The US, USA  – the United States of America 
WWII/WW2  – the Second World War 
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Delimitations 
In any written academic paper, there will always be certain delimitations one has to make. There is a hard 
line between what is interesting, and what is relevant, in the strictest sense. Something, an aspect that has 
not been used in the paper, might still be relevant to the overall topic and theme, but less so for the 
specific perspective. In this segment, some of the decisions and omissions that have been made will be 
explained in the following.  
Legal aspects 
A major aspect of this conflict that has been omitted is the legal aspect. In any conflict or crisis, national or 
international, law will always have a strong presence. What is the law? Are these actions legal etc. While 
there obviously are questions of law in terms the Ukrainian crisis, both at the national, regional and 
international, they are not directly helpful in answering what types of societies are involved in the crisis, 
and how to look at their actions. While the question of international law as something in use, in the crisis is 
highly relevant, the specifics of its use or any following legal debates are less so. International law in this 
case, is more used as an indicator for the existence of it as an institution, and less so about the results, rules 
or debates on its use.  
A central part of this crisis, and any that involves outside interference or internal separatists/rebels is the 
question of sovereignty. Sovereignty specifically as a wider legal term has been omitted, and has rather 
been enshrined in the institution of sovereignty, territoriality and borders. Similar to international law as a 
general observation, so too is sovereignty used in this institution and society setting, as something that is 
acknowledged, or something that is dismissed. Also like international law, to which sovereignty arguably 
plays a part, there is no dispute that it would be a very interesting subject to research, and especially 
relevant to the overall Ukrainian crisis. It is however less so to the specific perspective of this paper.  
Content and scope 
Some more practical and tangible delimitations in this project are the involvement of other actors. This 
project takes its point of departure in the actions of the EU and the Russian Federation within the setting of 
the Ukrainian Crisis. The EU and the Russian Federation are hardly the only actors that have made an 
impact, or involved themselves in the conflict. The United States of America has also participated in 
sanctioning the Russian Federation as well as the pro-Russian separatists. In fact a multitude of countries 
and organisations have been involved in this conflict, be it in terms of diplomacy, aid or sanctions. However, 
to make sure that the scope remains reasonable and the analysis undiluted, the choice was made to keep 
the focus primarily on the EU and the Russian Federation. 
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A last point is that the Ukrainian Government and armed forces, as well as the pro-Russian separatists are 
only used here in the context of the general events of the Ukrainian crisis, as well as in the context of the 
EU and the Russian Federation. Again, this is done to realistically limit the scope, as well as making sure that 
the core question and analysis remains undiluted.  
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Chapter 2: Methodological considerations 
This methodological chapter will collect some of the consideration that have been made in the writing of 
this paper. This specific methodological chapter will primarily emphasise the challenge of collecting data in 
a multi-lingual conflict that is still very much active. Another consideration that is covered here is the 
question of using the EU as a standalone/independent actor, as opposed to emphasizing its individual 
Member States. 
Empirical material and data collection 
Whenever a paper is written, there are always special circumstances regarding empirical material and data 
collection. Some papers are written in the aftermath of an event, some leading to the event and others still 
in the middle of the event. All of these different settings in turn create different challenges for empirical 
data and material. While several books, academic articles and newsfeeds might be available in the 
aftermath of an event, it might be increasingly limited the closer a paper is to the start of the event it is 
covering. This paper is no exception. 
This paper, at the time of writing is still in the middle of the Ukrainian Crisis, yet far enough removed from 
when it ensued, for there to be a certain amount of material available. However, as the crisis in Ukraine is 
very much still present, and as such, the current status of the conflict might easily change, a date will be set 
for the perspectives in this paper. The last updated source included in this paper is from the 18th of June 
2015, and as such, the paper cannot and will not include considerations for events occurring after this date. 
A fundamental problem when writing a paper is that often, the people, organisations or even countries 
involved are not native to the author. This poses a particular problem when it comes to languages. In this 
case, the conflict that is in focus primarily involves the EU, representing 28 countries, Ukraine as well as the 
Russian Federation. While the EU can be counted on to make statements, treaties and other documents in 
English, the same is not necessarily true of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. As such, and effort has 
been made to include English language sources from the both Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The 
language of the sources however, is arguably not the most prudent consideration in this case. When 
working with a great deal of news articles, as is usually the case in contemporary events, bias must, if 
possible, be avoided. In this case, that has been attempted not by trying to overemphasise unbiased 
sources1, but instead to try and balance the sources. While the British BBC in all likelihood has a Western 
bias, so too does the Kyivpost arguably have a Ukrainian bias, and the RT and Tass a Russian bias. The 
                                                          
1
 If such exist.  
 11 
preference here is to balance bias, instead of attempting to eliminate it. As such sources have been 
included from a multitude of countries, as well as several organisations with different national orientations.  
A central consideration in this paper is also how the actors involved are compared. Instead of arguing from 
the point of view of the separate and independent 28 Member States of the European Union, or even the 
largest and most influential, the central analysis is still done from an EU perspective. The reason for this is 
that in terms of the sanctioning regime put in place, the 28 Member States are all doing this under the 
umbrella of the EU, and have all been part of a vote to pass and implement these sanctions. As such, it is 
believed that the EU, the actor under which the sanctions have been made, is the central actor to focus on.    
Project Design  
This section will feature the project design, the function of which, is that of a reading guide. It will briefly 
and succinctly present the key chapters of the paper, and explain how the paper should be read. The 
overall purpose of the project is “How has the European Union affected the actions of the Russian 
Federation in Ukraine, and has its agenda been successful?” and as such, a structure has been created with 
the purpose of looking at this specific problem statement.  
In Chapter 1, the overall intention is to introduce the reader to the background and theme of the overall 
problem statement. It is meant to introduce the setting of the problem, as well as the actors that are 
involved in that setting. It also contains the problem statement as well as the working steps, as well as a 
brief segment detailing the relevant delimitations of the paper.  
In Chapter 2, the focus is on the methodological considerations of the paper. It deals with the choice of 
theory, as well as s segment on sources in use and relevant considerations for those very sources. The 
purpose is to provide the reader with some of the consideration that have been made in relation to the 
circumstances regarding empirical data.  
In Chapter 3, the purpose is to present the theoretical framework that will be used to analyse the gathered 
empirical material. The reader will be introduced to the theoretical perspectives of English School scholar 
Hedley Bull and Barry Buzan. Combined, the combined theoretical framework of the English School will be 
presented. Within this chapter, institutions, values and societal archetypes will be introduced, and their use 
explained.  
In Chapter 4, the contextual analysis will take place. It will present the empirical data relevant to the 
Ukrainian Crisis in a combined framework. It will also questions certain of the actions and inconsistencies 
covered in the empirical data.     
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In Chapter 5, the actual operationalization of the English School theoretical framework will take place. The 
empirical data, actions and inconsistencies will be put into the context of English School theory, especially 
the conceptual framework of institutions, values and societal archetypes. The ultimate purpose of this 
exercise is to provide the material needed to provide an answer to the overarching problem statement. 
In Chapter 6, the conclusion on the problem statement will be made. It will represent the culmination of 
problem statement, empirical data and analysis, all boiled down to the essence.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical considerations 
The purpose of this theoretical considerations chapter is to be presented to the theoretical framework, in 
which this paper will be analyzed. It will present the key thinkers that are used in the paper, as well as the 
key concepts of their respective theoretical contributions. The theoretical considerations are in effect the 
foundation of the analytical framework, the operationalization of the theory. In this chapter you will be 
introduced to Hedley Bull, one of the pioneers of the English School, as well as Barry Buzan with his more 
recent attempt at operationalizing the theoretical framework of English School.   
Bull and the anarchical society  
To look at society of states, Bull argues that one must first define what constitutes a state. Bull in his book 
The Anarchical Society (Bull 2002) defines a state as a unit with firm geographical borders, which exists 
both normatively and factually. A state has two specific aspects, the internal claim to sovereignty, and the 
external claim to sovereignty. The internal claim is the complete authority over ones people and 
institutions, and the external claim is the idea that the state, is externally seen as sovereign within its 
territories (Bull 2002: pp. 8-9). 
The normative and the factual existence of these sovereign claims is central to the definition of a real state, 
as the claim to sovereignty in a normative sense is not enough to constitute a state. A state must also 
factually be in control of its geographically demarcated area, as well as all forms of authority within. 
Examples given of this not being the case, could be Germanic tribes that did not gave firm geographical 
boundaries, or nations under the jurisdiction of the Pope and Holy See (Bull 2002: 9). In effect and much as 
Buzan would argue, this constitutes the in and out aspect of a state. It constitutes internal power/control 
and external power/control.  
What constitutes a system of states is when there is sufficient interaction between states as make them a 
factor in decisions taken. This can be for good or bad, trade or war, or even neutrality. What remains 
central is the fact that other states, in a system of states, means that they part of the equation of decision 
making (Bull 2002: pp. 10-11). While this is argued as a basic definition of a system of states, there are 
many ideas about how such a structure looks. Bull specifically mentions Martin Wight’s idea of a system of 
state only existing when there is no permanent hegemonic power, because only then is there a chance of 
true sovereignty (Bull: 2002: 10). Bull transitions from systems of state, to society of states by promptly 
stating that: 
 “A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
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common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” 
(Bull 2002: 13).  
A society of states or international society then per the above definition presupposes a system of states or 
an international system. A society of states based on criteria such as common interests, norms and values 
can hardly exist if the states involved do not recognized that there are other actors that influence their 
decisions; the very definition of a system of states.  
As Bull starts out emphasizing, his book aims to look at international order and “by international order is 
meant a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains those goals of the society of states that 
are elementary, primary or universal” (Bull 2002: 16) Of these elementary, primary or universal goals, the 
first is the existence and protection of said system and society of states. The second is the protection of the 
external sovereignty of the states that constitute the system and society. The cost of which, is of course the 
recognition of other states right to their external and internal sovereignty. Third is the idea of peace, but as 
Bull emphasizes, not some sort of utopian global peace, but rather a certain sense of stability within the 
system and society of states. The fourth goal is more disparate but also more common. Limiting violence, 
respecting sovereign rights, ensuring communication and respecting deals and arrangements, and other 
common themes to ensure the survival and validity of a system and society of states is the focus of the 
fourth goal of international order.  
One of the more central debates or points of contention in English School theory are the institutions in 
different societies of states. These very institutions and more will form part of the analytical framework for 
looking at the Ukrainian crisis and the relevant actors. 
These below are what Bull argues to be the primary institutions, the goals so to speak that goes beyond 
actual institutions like the UN, Which Buzan might argue to be secondary or tertiary institutions (Buzan 
2004 look for the institution tables). These could also be argued to be the institutions that in Bull 
conception of English School theory compose the more traditional Westphalian pluralist society, the ones 
that still exist even when moving over into pluralism-plus.  
- Balance of Power 
- International law 
- Diplomacy  
- War 
- Great Powers (Bull 2002:13) 
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These are all held against the concept of order within the society of states, as opposed to their overall 
meaning for world politics. Buzan’s newer suggestion for those very same primary institutions are slightly 
different, but as can be seen below, also includes secondary institutions, and the primary institutions are 
divided between master and derivative primary institutions (Buzan 2004: 187). Buzan suggests, that the 
English School perception of institutions, comes close to how many other theoretical perspectives and 
scholars would attempt to define them, as “relatively fundamental and durable practises, that are evolved 
more than designed; and that they are constitutive of actors and their patterns of legitimate activity in 
relation to each other” (Buzan 2004: 167).  
 
 
(Buzan 2004: 187) 
 
A concepts that it often used within English School, is that of values. Values are a nebulous term at the best 
of times. Buzan describes the archetypical understanding of values as “A conventional understanding of 
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values in the social sense is: the moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social 
group” (Buzan 2004: 164). In a more English School setting, the sharing of norms, values and such, is 
primarily relevant to look at, when it goes beyond the principle of coexistence, when actors consciously 
converge their things such as policy and collective action (Buzan 2004: 146).  
The pluralist and solidarist debate or spectrum will exist as a sort of umbrella for the types of possible 
societies, as well as the types of institutions within those societies. However, before that occurs it would be 
prudent to briefly describe the original three pillars that made up English School theory, and still partially 
exist within modern theory.  
Hobbes, Kant and Grotius – The three traditional views of international conduct 
The Hobbesian view as described both by Buzan and Bull, is that the state in regards to international 
conduct, acts within a form of legal and moral vacuum. It is very power political and there is a perception of 
international conduct as being a zero-sum game. It is a system in which there is a winner and a loser in 
most transactions. It is argued that this Hobbesian view or pillar is what would traditionally be called the 
Westphalian model, but also one primarily defined within international relations, as being a realist 
perspective on state conduct. (Bull 2002: 24, Buzan 2004: 7).  
The Kantian persuasion is the universalist or cosmopolitan theme wherein morals and laws are very much 
present, but the role of the state less so. It is more about the community of man than the community of 
states, despite there being some transnational elements as well. The interests of all people are the same, 
and the wishes of states are transient. It heavily emphasises “us the people” in a global sense to be the 
main actors in the world, and that our interests, which are mainly the same in a universalist or 
cosmopolitan society. It could be argued to be  a society of ‘one-ness’ (Bull 2002: 24, Buzan 2004: 7) 
The Grotian understanding is much more of a mix, or middle approach. It believes in moral imperatives and 
following the rules of the system, but it does not see states in a constant struggle against each other, and 
only following rules when it suits the given state. It does however argue that states are the primary actors, 
and not as a Kantian perspective would suggest, a horizontal perspective with a community of mankind as 
the central actor. Trade, economy and social interactions form the foundation for the relationship between 
states and the international society at large. It is a society that moves beyond merely survival and singular 
nation interests, and makes room for common institutions, rules and values. It does however fall shy of the 
both the horizontal structure of Kantiansim and the vertical structure of Hobbesianism (Bull 2002: pp. 25-25, 
Buzan 2004: 7) 
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Buzan and the English School 
 
Pluralism 
Pluralism is not a concept that Bull uses in The Anarchical Society (Bull 2002) but as described above, he 
does spend significant time and energy on the traditional pillars that Buzan (2004) in his work transforms 
into the pluralism-solidarism spectrum of societies. Pluralism in Bulls case is a sort of proto-pluralism in the 
form of his thoughts on the Hobbesian, Kantian and Grotian pillars. In this case, as has been argued, the 
Hobbesian pillar is the one that most readily lends itself to the more modern conception of pluralism. This 
is arguably so due to the inherent realist assumptions of who the primary actors are, and perhaps even 
more so, which institutions are suggested. Buzan however, makes a clearer divide, as will be seen below. 
He argues not only for different degrees of pluralism, pluralism plus and solidarism, but also sets them on a 
scale of societal types.  
Pluralism-plus 
Pluralism-Plus inhabits the same scale as pluralism and solidarism, only its definition is slightly blurred. The 
general meaning of the term however, could be said to be what immediately extends solely pluralistic 
values and institutions, moving towards the solidaristic models (Buzan 2004: 158). The reason why the term 
is coined as it is, is arguably because pluralism-plus is still firmly entrenched in the traditional Westphalian 
institutions and society, but begins to incorporate certain solidaristic elements. 
Solidarism 
Solidarism, or in Bull words the Grotian or internationalist tradition lies between the two other traditional 
pillars of English School theory, the Kantian and the Hobbesian pillars. Much as Buzan would later come to 
argue, the Grotian tradition stands between, or via media, the Hobbesian and the Kantian tradition, much 
like it could be argued that English School theory in general occupies that very spot in international 
relations theory (Buzan 2004: 10). Solidarism, in Bull’s sense of the term is “more generally, the economic 
and social intercourse between one country and another” (Bull 2002: 25). Bull furthermore describes it as 
an acknowledgement and acceptance of a society that necessitates co-existence and to varying degrees 
requires cooperation (Bull 2002: 26).  
Bull following his definitions of the three pillars, i.e. the spectrum from pluralism of solidarism, argued that 
international society and its values never really ceases to exist. His argument is instead that the three pillars, 
that both pluralism and solidarism are in use constantly, but to varying degrees at varying times. Times of 
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peace might offer a greater degree of solidarism, despite only ever becoming what Buzan would call 
pluralism-plus. Yet in times of war or strife, a “regression” feasibly occurs that reinforces traditional 
pluralistic tendencies and institutions between those in a state of contention. That however does not mean 
that parts of the solidaristic society do not remain among the states that are in contention and those that 
are neutral. 
Buzan argued that in able to utilize English School, it would be beneficial to look transform the traditional 
pillars of English School theory into something less bound by Bull’s more traditional view  (Buzan 2004: pp. 
93-94). The foundation of the argument lies with the pluralism and solidarism spectrum, which includes the 
three traditional pillars to some extent (Buzan 2004: pp. 47-48) but also includes lesser but more specific 
points on the spectrum than what the traditional pillars would allow for (Buzan 2004: pp. 159-160). 
In this paper, it will be argued on this basis that time and circumstance might not be the only factors to 
change the different societies that lie in the pluralism and solidarism spectrum, but that different states 
might occupy different societies and emphasize different institutions and values.  
Buzan describes the depth of internalization by using the lower part of the figure below. Shallow to deep 
internalization, once again a spectrum, with coercion as shallow internalization, calculation lying in the 
middle and belief representing belief and a deep internalization. More importantly however, is that Buzan 
does not see these different points on the spectrum as actually being mutually exclusive at all, but rather 
sees it as a case as “ all elements are always in play” (Buzan 2004: 132). 
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(Buzan 2004: 159) 
Asocial 
As described by Buzan (2004: 159) asocial is an extreme condition, but also an artificial one. It is a state 
where diplomacy and other “softer” measures are out of the question, and where the purpose is absolute 
destruction. Buzan argues for it primarily belonging to literature as opposed to real life. It could be said to 
be on the far side of the Pluralist and Solidarist spectrum; an extreme pole on that spectrum so to speak 
(Buzan 2004: 159).  
Power political 
Power political unlike asocial however, is argued to be deeply historically entrenched, but also to some, 
firmly in use today. Power political is described as being the light version of the Westphalian model, where 
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states exist primarily to ensure their own survival. An important distinction, one that counts for most of the 
Pluralist interstate society models, is that it does not necessitate shared values or norms. Furthermore, 
institutions here are minimal, though diplomacy and alliance making is possible (Buzan 2004: pp. 159-160). 
Power political can also be referred to as the traditional Hobbesian pillar of the three original pillars of 
English School theory (Bull 2002: pp. 23-24, Buzan 2004: 159 and Buzan 2014: 79)    
Coexistence 
Where power political can be considered to be a light version of a Westphalian model of interstate 
societies, coexistence is there more traditional version. The coexistence type of interstate society is one 
where the institutions in play are, like the model, more traditional. It typically includes a focus on “balance 
of power, sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, war and international law” 
(Buzan 2004; 160 and Buzan 2014: 79). The coexistence interstate society model leans towards the more 
pluralist and realist interpretation of the Grotian English School pillar, making it a realist/rationalist 
combination.  
Cooperative 
Coexistence represents the pluralistic tendencies of the Grotian pillar, unlike cooperative which, on the flip 
side represents the more solidaristic tendencies. In case of the cooperative interstate society model, 
institution start changing and values start intersecting and aligning between the members of such a society. 
War, it is argued might not have a place as a valid institution anymore, and cooperation, diplomacy and 
shared values have a much greater occurrence and emphasis in the interstate society. In the same way that 
war as an institution could be argued to be demoted or illegitimated, so could new institutions arise within 
this more solidaristic tendency. Examples of these new more solidaristic oriented institutions could be 
equality, human rights or even environment. These solidaristic institutions could be argued from Bull’s 
point of view to constitute “pluralism-plus”, secondary institutions that arise only after the conditions for a 
stable pluralistic society have been attained (Buzan 2002: 160 and Buzan 2014: 80.  
Convergence 
Convergence, much like the other models of interstate societies, is aptly named. Convergence is a model of 
interstate society where there is a high degree of convergence in terms of values and norms, described to 
be extensive enough to create a society of likeminded political, legal and economic states. There is no 
single arch type of convergence state, it can be a collection of western liberal democracies as well as a 
collection of theocracies or any other kind of state sharing a wide set of norms, values and institutions 
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(Buzan 2004: 160). What does tie them together in a convergence centred interstate society, is that they 
both share values and so forth, but also that they actively model these points on each other, thereby 
converging (Buzan 2004: 160 and Buzan 2014: 80).  
Confederative 
Confederative is the opposite pole on the spectrum of pluralism and solidarism. Where asocial is a model of 
a total anathematic relationship between states, confederative is a model of extreme convergence, just shy 
of a single political entity. Buzan argues for this being the case of the European Union (Buzan 2004: 160), 
and that it includes a general convergence as well as “an addition of significant intergovernmental 
organizations” (Buzan 2004: 160).  
These different forms of interstate societies can be seen on the model above, including other societal 
models that are not relevant to this paper and theory. The model not only shows the different relevant 
interstate societies in relation to each other, but also how these different interstate societies are achieved 
through either coercion, calculation or through belief.  
Civilian Power Europe (describing the validity of specifically using the EU as an actor): 
Unlike Manners (Manners 2002: 3) and to some extent Buzan, who describes the EU as a subsystem (Buzan 
2004: 142) Hedley Bull in his oft-quoted Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? (Bull 1982) firmly 
doubts that Europe as a single entity and by extension the then European Community would ever really 
amount to a real power in international affairs “Europe” is not an actor in international affairs, and does not 
seem likely to become one” (Bull 1982: 151). Bull states that in relation to Europe in the extent of acting 
within international affairs should not be looked at as a single entity, as the European Community nor what 
followed; the European Union. Instead Bull argues in his text that it is to the national governments that one 
should turn for European actors in international affairs (Bull 1982: 152).  
“A key part of the argument in this book is that the elements that make up international society are not 
found only at the global level, but also, and simultaneously, at a range of sub-global scales” (Buzan 2004: 
134) 
Those differences and dimensions should give a template to use on the EU and Russia. These templates will 
help explain how and why the two actors act.  
International society in the English School sense is not always expressively and exclusively defined as being 
global in nature. Bull might argue for it being the case (Bull 2002: 169) but Buzan begs to differ. Buzan very 
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explicitly argues for that specific point, that English School theory, does indeed allow for a sub-global or 
regional perspective, but that it has been neglected (Buzan 2004: 207). Bull does however consider the idea 
of a reform of the state system, and was seemingly open to the idea of what regionalism might contribute 
(Bull 2002: 295). While Stivachtis has a slightly different perspective, he none the less also acknowledges 
the idea of a European International Society, that is, a sub-global societal setting, much like this paper will 
argue (Stivachtics 2013). It seems a tendency for modern scholars to look at the societal archetypes as not 
sole being a global phenomena, but also a regional one. Schouenborg argues for the existence of a regional 
European international society, one that in academia has also established itself as separate branch of 
international relations (Schouenborg 2013: 65).    
The above point is arguably one of the reasons why I feel that English School theory is not only valid, but 
also relevant. As Buzan emphatically points out (Buzan 2004: 207) English School theory does indeed have 
the tool to look at regional structures and sub-global societies in general, but that it despite this is rarely 
done. The aim in this paper however, is not merely to classify the types of societies at work, but also how 
they have interacted in the Ukrainian Crisis.  
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Chapter 4: Contextual analysis 
 
From Euromaidan to War in Donbass 
This segment of the paper will primarily introduce a timeline of the relevant events in Ukraine. It will do so 
using a variety of sources to list what has happened between the parties in the conflict, namely the 
European Union, Ukraine, the Ukrainian separatists as well as Russia. It will detail major events such as the 
Association Agreement,, it will also detail events of a political, economic, diplomatic as well as of a military 
nature.  
Following the timeline, an effort will be made into looking at what kind of events have occurred, and how 
to potentially classify them, both in terms of actors involved, but also from a perspective of the indicators 
of types of societies involved.  
The Euromaidan 
As this paper will both implicitly and explicitly deal with the consequences of the Euromaidan affair and the 
general unrest or crisis in Ukraine, an endeavour shall be made to explain in what context “Euromaidan” is 
used.   
Euromaidan literally means Euro-Square, and the reason for this, is that the unrest itself primarily took 
place on the Ukrainian Independence Square, the same place where the Orange Revolution took place 
years earlier (Chapman 2014a: 64). The “Euro” part specifically refers to the cause of the unrest that took 
place on Independence Square (Chapman 2014a: 64). The reason was that Yanukovych and his cabinet 
refused to sign the Association Agreement that it had been developing with the EU for years (Motyl 2013b: 
52). Instead it seemed that Yanukovych was aiming for integration with Russia and its proposed Eurasian 
Union (Motyl 2013b: 57, Wilson 2014: pp. 188-190 and Cadier 2014: 76).  Elements of the Ukrainian 
population strongly disagreed with that choice, and gathered for peaceful protests on Independence 
Square (Motyl 2013b: 52), arguably hoping for a result like the Orange Revolution. However, instead of 
changing the decision or stepping down, the ‘Berkut’ riot police was sent to quell the unrest (Chapman 
2014b: 69). This development sparked further unrest, and significant confrontation between the protesters 
of Independence Square, or Euromaidan as it was colloquially referred to. The protests were not in vain as 
Yanukovych made a deal to remove himself from office within a set time limit, despite more than a 100 
casualties the week earlier (Chapman 2014b: 69). An ultimatum from one of the ring leaders of the protests 
forced him to flee the country almost immediately after the arrangement had been made (Chapman 2014a: 
pp. 69-70). The reaction to the protests by the Ukrainian authorities, under Yanukovych was met with 
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criticism from foreign dignitaries, such as US Secretary of State, John Kerry as well as EU High 
Representative Catherine Ashton who visited the square (Motyl 2013b: pp. 53-54). 
The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
Much like with the Euromaidan definition above, it would be beneficial to know what an Association 
Agreement actually entails. This is especially true as the Association Agreement is intrinsically linked to the 
protest.  
An Association Agreement is not an agreement that is unique to Ukraine. It is a type of agreement from 
European Community times, thus predating the European Union, that that sets up a bilateral framework. 
This bilateral framework between the now EU and third party countries broadly aims at different 
liberalisation trade initiatives. While the concept of an Association Agreement is not unique in itself, the 
specific agreement between the EU and a third party country usually is unique (eeas.europa.eu 2009). The 
EU and Ukraine’s specific Association Agreement is described as being an agreement that “constitutes a 
new state in the development of EU-Ukraine contractual relations, aiming at political association and 
economic integration” (eeas.europa.eu 2015d). Broadly speaking, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
involves areas such as values and principles, foreign and security policy, justice, freedom and security as 
well as energy and enhanced cooperation in some 28 other policy areas (eeas.europa.eu 2012: pp. 1-2). 
During the crisis in Ukraine, EU diplomacy has not been limited to sanctions or restrictive measures against 
Russia or Ukrainian separatists. The EU and Ukraine since after the events of Euromaidan have continuously 
been working on Ukraine’s entry into the Association Agreement. The first steps of this was the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that came 
into force in 1998 (eeas.europa.eu 2015a: 1, europa.eu 2010c and Bobick and Dunn 2014: 406). Following 
these political and economic integration talks about the actual Association Agreement,  a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area was negotiated in the period of 2007 to 2011, though it was not actually 
initialled until 2012 (eeas.europa.eu 2015a: 2). The talks that where signed and negotiated from 2007 to 
2012, were further realized by the signing of the political provisions of the Association Agreement on the 
21st of March 2014 (consilium.europa.eu 2014b: 1 and eeas.europa.eu 2015d) and the remaining 
Association Agreement provisions on the 27th of June 2014 (eeas.europa.eu 2014a and 2015d). The 
application of certain aspects of these provisions started shortly after on the 1st of November 
(eeas.europa.eu 2015a 2). This process had certain setbacks however, one example of this is around the 
time of the Euromaidan in late November of 2013, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers decided not to sign 
the Association Agreement – A decision that was later turned around (eeas.europa.eu 2013a: 2). Despite 
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those setbacks, the Association Agreement was signed, and the first meeting of the Association Council 
took place on the 15th of December 2014 (consilium.europa.eu 2014c: 1).  
In effect, during the crisis, there has been more than one response the EU. All of the negotiations that have 
occurred are highly relevant to the paper. The protests of the Euromaidan in late 2013 happened due to a 
general dissatisfaction with the Yanukovych regime refusing to sign off on the Association Agreement with 
the EU. Something that a significant portion of the Ukrainian population felt was a betrayal large enough 
for them to take to the streets. This eventually meant de-facto exiling the then-incumbent President, and a 
led to the current civil unrest, separatist actions and arguably the annexation of Crimea by Russia. It could 
be argued that the actions leading to the Euromaidan protests have been ameliorated with the signing of 
the provisions of the Association Agreement, however the annexation of Crimea and the separatist action 
in eastern Ukraine is another matter entirely.    
The reason why the Association Agreement is so important is that the matter of Ukraine’s position within 
the East-West worldview has been debated extensively for the past many years. Comparisons have been 
made between Ukraine and Belarus (Valychenko 2007). Other perspectives were that from a Eurasian 
perspective, Ukraine was still subjected to Moscow authority (Beisswenger 2007: pp. 46-47). Much the 
same is questioned by Iinytzkyi, though more specifically on Russian or Imperial culture in the Eurasian 
region (Iinytzkyi 2007: 64). The question of where Ukraine belongs, and what problems it faces, is one 
explored by several authors (Riabchuk 2007, Pavlyshyn 2007, Serbyn 2007, Semeniy 2007, Solonenko 2007, 
Gillingham III 2007, Sherr 2007) from several perspectives. What it does indicate however, is that the 
decision for Ukraine to pursue the Association Agreement and break from the Russian Federation is no 
small matter. Poulsen-Hansen’s studies indicates much the same, and emphasizes that the EU, post-
enlargement wave, was actually content with the movement of Ukraine from Russian towards the EU, and 
had a 3-point strategy outlined for closer relations between the EU and Ukraine (Hansen-Poulsen 2004: 33). 
Leonid Kuchma, the 2nd President of Ukraine, is also noted saying that Ukraine could be ready to join the EU 
by 2011 (Hansen-Poulsen 2004: 33). Less optimistic, but along the same vein, projections of EU 
membership was suggested as a possibility within 7 and 15 years by some in 2005 (Karatnycky 2005: 17). 
While this has obviously not been the case, it illustrates a willingness to join the EU, and the Association 
Agreement shows a degree of economic integration and political and legal convergence.  
 
Increased support and cooperation 
Beyond efforts on sanctions and restrictive measures, as well as statements regarding the crisis in Ukraine, 
there have been initiatives aimed at providing support and cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. This 
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segment won’t deal with the specifics of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, but rather aspects that 
run parallel to those very efforts, or at times intersect. 
 Between the period of the 5th of March 2014 and the time of writing, the EU has made available several 
means of support to the Ukrainian authorities. One of these means of support, was a money lending 
structure, that allows for the Ukrainian authorities to loan up to €11 Billion via different long and short 
term approaches (Europa.eu 2014a). Moreover, the EU adopted a legal act that would remove customs 
duties on a temporary basis, thus being able to save an approximate €500 million yearly (consilium 2014a). 
The EU announced the creation of a support group for Ukraine on the 23rd of April 2014, with the purpose 
of providing assistance in matters of Ukrainian governance. The short term purpose is stated as having a 
framework wherein the Member States and can offer various means of assistance in order to stabilise the 
politico-economic situation in Ukraine, provide technical expertise to help provide for growth oriented 
circumstances in Ukraine through reforms. Lastly, the expertise offered will allow the Member States to 
help target specific reforms needed to make EU benefits available through the Association Agreement, but 
also the Visa Liberalisation Plan. These initiatives are to be completed within 2014 (europa.eu 2014b)  
The Support Group also included medium term goals that are to be in force from 2015 and onwards. The 
purpose of these goals are to ameliorate a more comprehensive reform system than what has above, been 
proposed short term (europa.eu 2014b). 
On the 8th of July 2014, a meeting was held to raise, coordinate and implement international support, but 
from EU Member States, but also from other actors such as the United States, Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland as well as a slew of international organisations (europa.eu 2014c). Further economic assistance 
has been proposed for the 2015-2016 period, of up to €1.8 billion. This decision was adopted on the 15th of 
April 2015, and constitutes the 3rd round of EU loans to Ukraine (europe.eu 2015a)  
The European Union also supported the stability efforts in Ukraine by supporting some of the organisations 
directly involved, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Beyond that, the 
EU has also made immediate contributions to humanitarian aid, as well as providing vehicles, staff and 
funding for the OSCE monitoring mission (eeas.europa.eu 2015a: 9 ). 
The initiatives that the EU have been part of, seems to be built on an increase of integrative measures of 
norms, values and institutions, both in an English School sense, but also in a more direct, non-theoretical 
one. Values such as justice, freedom and security have been reiterated throughout the EU’s diplomatic 
framework.  
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Restrictive Measures and Sanctions 
A noteworthy development in the crisis in Ukraine has been the activity of two actors, both of whom are 
ironically not native to Ukraine. The background of the Euromaidan protests have been commented on 
throughout this paper, but the aftermath of that very crisis is perhaps even of greater import. In the wake 
of the Euromaidan protests and the de-facto exile of Yanukovych, Russia made an unprecedented land grab 
with the annexation of the Crimean peninsula. It had already been noted however, that Crimea was of 
special interest to Russia “The [Crimean] transfer remains a thorn in Moscow’s relations with Kiev because 
the Russian fleet continues to be harboured on this strategic Black Sea peninsula” (Figes 2013: pp. 61-62). 
Russia annexing Crimea was not without consequences, and this paper will specifically focus on how the EU 
reacted to the annexation, but also later actions.  
The Council of the European Union adopted a set of conclusions in regards to the situation in Ukraine. This 
happened the 10th of February 2014, and the overall theme of these conclusions can be summarized as 
follows: “The Council emphasizes the right of all sovereign states to make their own foreign policy decisions 
without undue external pressure” (consilium.europa.eu 2014d: 2). The Council of the European Union was 
concerned not just with the potential human rights violations, or the mass disappearances, but also with 
possibility of foreign actors influencing these events. Furthermore, the Council, deplored the causalities on   
both sides, and it implored the Ukrainian authorities to do everything in their power to respect the rights of 
its citizens. It also implored the proper authorities to distance themselves from the violence committed, as 
well as the targeting of journalists and others (consilium.europa.eu 2014d pp. 1-2). As a final note, the 
Council added that the EU volunteers to help with a Ukrainian reform process, one that the EU believed to 
be vital in order for Ukraine and its citizens to thrive (consilium.europa.eu 2014d: 2).  
Many of the same points were reiterated by the Council of the European Union only 10 days after, but in an 
arguably more aggressive tone. The Council stated that it was appalled at the situation in Ukraine. It 
believed it to be the responsibility of both the authorities, ring leaders and representatives, to ensure that 
the violence was not committed on either side of the conflict (consilium.europa.eu 2014e: 1). In general the 
Council hoped that the situation could be deescalated on all sides, and a dialogue between the parties 
established. The Council and the EU at large, also stated that they were very willing to help facilitate a 
dialogue in order to ensure a de-escalation of violence. Furthermore, the offer for help with reform was 
reiterated (consilium.europa.eu 2014e: 2). The most dramatic development however, was that the Council 
introduced targeted sanctions in the form of asset freezes, visa bans as well as sanctions on certain exports 
that could be used for internal repression (consilium.europa.eu 2014e: 2).   
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Crimea soon became the focus of talks regarding Ukraine. Protests between pro-, and anti-Russian groups 
in Crimea started up (rt.com 2014a), and set the atmosphere for how future developments in Crimea would 
happen. Crimea is an area that as mentioned above has had a special status for both countries before, and 
as such, some of the most dramatic events of the Ukrainian crisis occurred on this peninsula between 
Ukraine and Russia. The protests and clashes quickly escalated and Russian-backed troops were seen 
closing down roads leading into and out of Crimea, effectively controlling the flow of people and material 
going in and out (Mackinnon 2014).  
Shortly after on the 27th of February, a referendum behind closed doors and guarded by gunmen was held 
(in.reuters.com 2014). The result was the outing of the elected regional prime minister from the Party of 
Regions. The party of regions previously held 80% of the seats in the Crimean parliament, but in the closed 
and secret referendum lost to the head of the Russian Unity party, Sergei Aksyonov  – one that during the 
previous election only managed to get 4% of the votes (in.reuters.com 2014). Several parliamentarians 
later described being coerced into voting for Aksyonov, while others described not even being in Crimea, 
but that their votes were registered regardless (in.reuters.com 2014).  
On the 1st of March 2014, the Russian senate, or upper house, allowed the use of Russian armed forces in 
Ukraine (Lally et al. 2014). This legitimized, on a national basis at least, the ability to directly and militarily 
interfere within another sovereign nation. This was seen as by the interim president of Ukraine as a 
complete disregard for Ukrainian sovereignty, a sentiment that was shared for foreign officials, such as Carl 
Bildt, the Swedish Foreign Minister. Carl Bildt stated that the Russian authorities allowing Putin to use 
Russian troops in Ukraine without their express permission, constitutes a direct breach of international law 
(Lally et al. 2014).  
Putin seemingly believed otherwise however, stating that Russia could not possibly have forces people by 
way of arms into the voting booths, and that the Crimean Parliament and the Crimean people themselves 
chose their independence and subsequent secession to the Russian Federation, something it considerd 
completely legitimate (en.kremlin.ru 2014a).  
As opposed to the more neutrally worded Council report of the 1st of March, the one issued two days later 
was more aggressively worded. Not only did the EU in this report condemn the violation of Ukrainian 
sovereignty, but it also condemned the sanctioning of armed forces in Ukraine by the Russian authorities 
(consilium.europa.eu 2014g: 1). The Council conclusion also went as far as calling this Russian authorisation 
a breach of the UN Charter. There was, and still is, a general call for Russia to withdraw from Crimea, 
respect Ukrainian sovereignty and participate in consultations requested by the Ukrainian government 
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(consilium.europa.eu 2014f: 1). The Council and the EU, yet again called for a peaceful solution to the 
unrest, and once again offered to mediate where necessary, to ensure peace and stability. The more 
aggressive tone came in the form of the Council and the EU warning Russia that any bilateral arrangements 
between the two actors are subject to change, and are in general at risk if Russia does not help in 
deescalating the situation (consilium.europa.eu 2014f: 2). Furthermore, Russia’s G8 spot will be temporarily 
suspended, and the meeting in Sochi that the Russian Federation would have hosted would be cancelled. A 
more vague warning came in the form of the EU warning that it is ready and willing to take further 
measures, should the situation change. In regards to the Ukrainian government, the Council commented 
that it and its Member States were ready to help out with certain financial matters, as well the 
international monetary institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (consilium.europa.eu 2014f: 
2). Lastly, the Council in its conclusion reaffirmed its commitment to the Association Agreement between 
the EU and Ukraine (consilium.europa.eu 2014f: 2). 
The Council of the European Union only two days after its last conclusion sent out a press release on a 
Council decision. The decision covered the implementation of an asset freeze for misappropriated 
Ukrainian state funds, and initially covered 18 persons for up to 12 months (consilium.europa.eu 2014g: 1).  
From the highest echelons of EU power, a statement from the Heads of State or Government, the European 
Council, came on the 6th of March. The statement commented on a lot of the above themes, such as a 
Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, and a demand for their adherence to international standards. 
Furthermore it directly called the referendum held by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea illegal, as it went against the statutes of the Ukrainian Constitution (consilium.europa.eu 2014h: 1). 
The European Council reiterated what was included in the conclusion and decision of the Council of the 
European Union, both in terms of immediate cooperation with Russia, if the Federation does not stop 
destabilizing Ukraine and Crimea, but also the potential for more far reaching economic and political 
consequences (consilium.europa.eu 2014g: 2 and consiulum.europa.eu 2014i: 1). In conclusion, the 
European Council also reaffirmed its commitment to assist Ukraine with financials, reforms, energy as well 
as general advice (consilium.europa.eu 2014g: pp. 3-4 and consilium.europa.eu 2014j: 2).  
Following the occupation of the Crimean parliament, as well as the alleged fraudulent voting earlier 
(consilium.europa.eu 2014j: 1 and in.reuters.com 2014) the Crimean parliament has yet again voted. This 
time the vote was not for a change in parliament leadership, nor for its independence from Ukraine, but 
rather a referendum to join Russia. The referendum was held the 17th of March, only a day after the vote to 
leave secede from Ukraine, and was met with much the same result (Morello et al. 2014 and bbc.com 
2014a). An almost universal agreement was made to formally apply for Crimea to join the Russian 
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Federation, as a part of its federal territories. This counted for Crimean peninsula in general, but also 
Sevastopol in particular (Morello et al. 2014 and bbc.com 2014).  
There was no time wasted with the response by the Russian Federation. President Putin signed the laws on 
the reunification of Crimea with Russia the 18th of March (tass.ru 2014). The entire process, from initial 
uprising and protests in Crimea, to a shift in parliament position, referendum for independence, and lately 
a referendum to join Russia, only took from late February of 2014, to mid March. Within the greater 
context of the unrest in Ukraine, from protests in Kiev to the Crimea being annexed by Russia, was only 
little more than a month apart.    
Following the actual Crimean parliamentary vote to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, 
the European Council strongly condemned the election, referendum as well as the annexation of Crimea 
(consilium.europa.eu 2014k: 2). They called the referendum illegal, and mentioned in an earlier conclusion, 
that they had taken place at gunpoint (consilium.europa.eu 2014j: 1). The European Council promised to 
evaluate their options for economic, trade and financial restrictions in Crimea, and to do it fast 
(consilium.europa.eu 2014k: 2). Lastly, the European Council recalled the warning it had given the Russian 
Federation, that should it keep up its destabilizing activities in Ukraine, then the EU and its Member States 
would be forced to answer with far-reaching restrictive targeted measures (consilium.europa.eu 2014k: 3).  
The outrage over the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as Russian Federation actions and trade 
to pro-Russian separatist was specifically and aggressively commented on in a Presidential Statement by 
President Herman Van Rompuy and President José Manuel Barroso:  
“Arms and fighters continue flowing into Ukraine from the Russian Federation. Strong Russian State 
sponsored nationalist propaganda continues supporting the illegal actions of armed separatists. We have 
witnessed with anger and frustration the delays in providing international access to the site of the air crash, 
the tampering with the remains of the plane, and the disrespectful handling of the deceased.” 
(consilium.europa.eu 2014u: 2).  
Some of the specifics of the restrictive measures and sanctions levied against the Russian Federation and its 
illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol are part of a row of documents and amendments spanning from 
2014 to 2015 (eeas.europa.eu 2015b: pp. 106-115). The contents of these documents state that the selling 
of bonds, equity and other instruments of that type is not longer allowed, if the maturity of said 
instruments exceeds 30 days (europa.eu 2015b). These instruments specifically are not allowed to be 
bought, or sold by five Russian banks and subsidiaries, all of which are state owned. Three energy and three 
defence companies are also henceforth illegal to trade with (europa.eu 2015b). Other vital points of the 
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import/export ban involves services that are related to the financial instruments mentioned above, but 
beyond buying and selling, trading/brokering is also strictly disallowed. The five major banks are not 
allowed to receive loans from EU or EU Member State sources, be it citizen or company. The restrictive 
measures of the EU are also aimed at military equipment or so-called dual use goods. This equipment and 
goods are listed at length by the EU (eur-lex.eu 2014a). A broad range of energy related equipment and 
services also falls under the export ban; specifically for oil exploration, drilling, well testing and lastly 
logging (europa.eu 2014b).  
Crimea and Sevastopol are also under strict sanctions by the EU. Those sanctions primarily touch on the 
import of products, investments, tourism, certain exports, transportation, communication, energy such as 
gas, oil and mineral resources in the area of Crimea and Sevastopol (eur-lex.eu 2014b: pp. 46-49). In 
general, a non-recognition policy is effectively in place concerning the Crimean annexation.   
The question remains, have these sanctions been successful?  The Peterson Institute and The Economist 
both argue that in general, there is only a certain percentage of chance of success when using economic 
sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2007: 1 and economist.com 2014). For every Iran, there is a Cuba so to speak 
(economist.com 2014). The Economist argued early on that the sanctions in place at the time2 were not 
enough to make the difference needed (economist.com 2014). Others however, argue that while the 
sanctions will hurt both the EU and the Russian Federation, Russia is in for the brunt of the economic hurt 
(Vara 2014). Dreyer and Popescu point out that while the sanctions are indeed hurting the Russian 
economy, there are more things to consider. First of all the relative economy of the Russian Federation pre-
Ukraine crisis, which as already in a downturn (Dreyer and Popescu 2014: 2) due to its dependency on oil 
and gas exports, the second part is the sanctions in the wake of this Russian economic situation (Boghani 
2015: 2). Dreyer and Popescu furthermore argue that there are two camps when it comes to figuring out 
the success of the sanctioning. One camp seems it sanctions as hurting the West short term and the EU’s 
interests with Russia long term, and that even where that not the case, the Russian Federation is still going 
strong in Ukriane (Dreyer and Popescu 2014: 3). The other camp argues that there already is an impact on 
the Russian economy, and will continue to do so in the medium term, while it also argues, that in the short-
term it prevented the Russian Federation from moving on after taking Crimea (Dreyer and Popescu 2014: 3). 
Åslund, previous economic advisor to the Russian Federation and Ukraine in the 90’s argue strongly that 
the sanctions have made a major impact, stating that not only is the Russian Federation facing a downward 
economic spiral because of oil prices and the imposed sanctions. This is even more so the case due to the 
                                                          
2
 The time being 6/9 2014 
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fact that the Russian Federation in all likelihood will not be able to borrow money from any money institute, 
as its credit rating has been significantly lowered since the sanctions started (Boghani 2015). 
Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast 
Though many of the restrictive measures, or sanctions, are grounded on the illegal annexation of Crimea, 
the majority of tension turned to the Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast. These areas or cities, also 
colloquially known as the Donbass, are the seat of the worst of the civil unrest and separatist action 
following Euromaidan and the annexation of Crimea.  
In early March 2014, the unrest in Donestk escalated in a similar fashion as Crimea. Pro-Russian 
demonstrators ended up gaining control of, and occupying the government headquarters of Donestk  
(D’agata 2014). They were cleared out this first time, but the atmosphere in Donestk was such that pro-
Russian Ukrainians wanted to invite the Russian armed forces to protect them and their interests (D’agata 
2014).  This was not an isolated incident however. Protesters, pro-Russian demonstrators took over 
political headquarters in not just Donestk, but also in Luhansk and Kharkiv (rt.com 2014c and bbc.com 
2014b). Flags were hoisted out of windows and building facades, and a demand for a referendum in the 
style of Crimea was demanded (rt.com 2014c, rt.com 2014d, bbc.com 2014b and bbc.com 2014c). Then 
Prime Minister of Ukraine, Arseny Yatseniuk, stated the 7th of March 2014, that the occupation of the 
political headquarters in the three different cities was simply a ploy to destabilize the region. The end goal 
he believed, was to bring in the Russian military, much like Crimea (Balmforth 2014, bbc.com 2014d and 
Zinets 2014). The overall conviction from Ukrainian officials is that Russia is actively trying to split up 
Ukraine, to destroy it as a sovereign nation, so that it can dominate the remains, much like it has Crimea 
(Balmforth and Zinets 2014).   
The newspapers were not the only ones to take note of this development. The EU, both in the form of the 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council of the European Union spoke 
out against the unrest in Eastern Ukraine (consilium.europa.eu 2014l: 1 and eeas.europa.eu 2014b: 1). Both 
Council and High Representative also agreed with the findings of the OSCE mission (OSCE 2014a: pp. 114-
121), and emphasised the relevancy of their concerns on minorities, language and citizenship in Crimea and 
Eastern Ukraine (consilium.europa.eu 2014l and eeas.europa.eu 2014b)  
Following the downing of Malaysian airlines flight MH17 on the 17th of July (eeas.europa.eu 2014g, rt.com 
2014h and theguardian.com 2014), sanctions against Russia, the Ukrainian pro-Russian separatists and 
specifically the annexed Crimea region were put on the fast track. A multitude of economic and trade 
sanctions were imposed, strengthened and renewed in the following period (consilium.europa.eu 2014m 
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through consilium.europa.eu 2014u, consilium.europa.eu 2015b, consilium.europa.eu 2015c, europa.eu 
2015b, eeas.europa.eu 2014f, eeas.europa.eu 2015e).    
The unrest hardly stopped here however. Going forwards, the Donbass region, Donestk and Luhansk has 
been the focal point of several armed confrontations between pro-Russian separatists and regional political 
buildings (Garanich 2014 and Rachkevych 2014) and pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian forces. 
Minsk I & II Protocols 
Despite all the unrest and the many confrontations and casualties, attempts at peace and ceasefires have 
been attempted. Most notably, these attempts are the Minsk 1 and the Minsk 2 Protocols for ceasefire. 
The Minsk Protocol meetings were presided over by the OSCE, who already had a mission sanctioned in 
Ukraine and the Russian border (OSCE 2014b). The OSCE was sent in a Special Monitoring Mission (OSCE 
2015a: 7). The mission was originally to help facilitate dialogue between the parties involved (OSCE 2015a: 
7), but with a changing picture of the conflict, it become more of a monitoring mission. While the 
monitoring continued, the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) was implemented in order for the respective 
governments of Ukraine and Russia to have a diplomatic forum (OSCE 2015a: 7). This specific TCG forum 
seemingly bore fruit in September 2014, with the first Minsk Protocol (OSCE 2015a: 7). 
 The first Minsk Protocol unfortunately is only official in Russian (OSCE  2014c), though unofficial 
translations are available (rt.com 2014e and kyivpost.com 2014).The Protocol deals with the establishment 
of a cease-fire between the actors, but it also contains more politically and administratively oriented points 
(rt.com 2014e and kyivpost.com 2014a). The ceasefire aside, it dealt with humanitarian elements, freeing 
hostages, continuing an inclusive national dialogue, conducting a decentralization of power, as well as 
consideration for the potential special status on Donestk and Luhansk (rt.com 2014e and kyivpost.com 
2014a).  
The basic points of the following Minsk Protocol memorandum was to provide a set of detailed rules for a 
formal cease-fire in the Donbass area that contains the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics. It 
was trying to limit large calibre weapons from near the contested area, as well as the overall elimination of 
armed activity. The cease-fire, or safety zone would then be observed by the OSCE monitoring mission, and 
they would also be responsible for taking care of escorting mercenaries or other militants out of the agreed 
safety zone (kyivpost.com 2014b). This cease-fire was signed by the OSCE Ambassador, the Second, and 
non-incumbent President of Ukraine, the Russian Federation Ambassador to Ukraine as well as two 
representatives from Donestk and Luhansk (Kyivpost.com 2014a, OSDCE 2014c).     
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Spokespersons from the EU welcomed the Minsk Protocol and memorandums. The EU’s reaction, though 
positive, still had firmly emphasised the central issue of Ukraine’s sovereignty “We hope that this will be a 
first step towards a sustainable political solution, based on respect for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity” (eeas.europa.com 2014c: 1). In one of the statements, the EU commented that “The EU stands 
ready to support any efforts related to the implementation of the ceasefire, including through the OSCE” 
(eeas.europa.com 2014c). Later when the memorandum was achieved, the EU once again supported the 
development, and noted that it seemed like hostilities and confrontations were down, and that the 
ceasefire so far showed success (eeas.europa.com 2014d: 1). 
The Breakdown of the Minsk 1 Protocol  
Unfortunately the ceasefire broke down a few months after in January (tass.ru 2015a, bbc.com 2015a, 
Lyman and Kramer 2015 and Walker and Grytsenko 2015). Reports from late January painted a bleak 
picture of resumed conflict between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass region “A 
shaky cease-fire has all but vanished, with rebel leaders vowing fresh attacks” (Lyman and Kramer 2015). 
Reports indicated engagements with hundreds of casualties, but still show willingness for peace and 
diplomacy (tass.ru 2015a). Other parties seem to indicate the opposite, and seemingly wish no further 
negotiations and diplomacy with Ukraine and Kiev (bbc.com 2015a). It is however unclear who threw the 
first proverbial fist following the ceasefire. Russian media, politicians and pro-Russian separatists argued 
that the Ukrainian forces struck first, and vice versa (tass.ru 2015a, bbc.com 2015a, Lyman and Kramer 
2015 and Walker and Grytsenko 2015). Why the breakdown of the ceasefire occurred, and who did it, is 
however not as relevant as the fact that it did occur. The EU, before the breakdown already spoke out 
against the rising hostilities in October the year before the breakdown “We are concerned about the 
intensification, in spite of the cease fire in place, of shooting and shelling in eastern Ukraine, which led 
yesterday to the tragic death of several civilians near a school in Donetsk. Many Ukrainian servicemen have 
equally died in fighting over the past weeks, notably as a result of the continued shelling of the Donetsk 
airport.” (eeas.europa.com 2014e: 1) 
Rise of the Minsk II Protocol 
Despite the unrest, and the broken ceasefire, an attempt was made to create a new ceasefire with new 
conditions. The ceasefire, colloquially known as the Minsk II Protocol was agreed upon on the 12th of 
February 2015 (OSCE.org 2015b, OSCE.org 2015c, bbc.com 2015b and Weaver and Luhn 2015). Much like 
the first Minks Protocol, the official document is not in English (OSCE 2015b). Fortunately, English 
translations do exist (telegraph.co.uk 2015). Many of the points included in the new Minsk II Protocol are 
arguably similar, such as rules for armament and troop position, as well as amnesty and the role of the 
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OSCE in the ceasefire. Certain changes have occurred however, such as the demand for specific legislation, 
as well as a deadline, concerning the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast region’s status (telegraph.co.uk 2015). 
Moreover, there are special considerations for Debaltseve, which has been the site of some of the fiercest 
conflicts in the crisis. By some reports, the new Minsk II Protocol heavily favored the pro-Russian separatist 
(Blair 2015). Seemingly no real agreement was made about the city of Debaltseve, which resulted in 
confrontations immediately following the Minsk II Protocol (Rettman 2015), the fighting, which lasted days 
eventually meant the complete withdrawal of the Ukrainian forces (Rettman 2015). Despite the Debaltseve 
confrontations, a shaky truce seemed to hold along the border of Ukraine and the two Donbass self-
proclaimed republics (Mukhina 2015). 
Summary – Assembling the Ukrainian Crisis 
The purpose of the contextual analysis was to shed light on the history of the Ukrainian crisis, but also to 
show what actions have been taken within that very crisis. What the above seems to indicate is that there 
first and foremost is such a things as the Ukrainian crisis, as opposed to several relatively isolated incidents, 
such as the Euromaidan, Crimean Annexation and the War in Donbass. These, along with the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement are all part of the same story, one were actors have vied for dominance and 
influence on a national level in Ukraine, but also internationally between the EU and Russia. The crisis in 
Ukraine has seemingly turned into the political, diplomatic, economic and in all probability also a military 
battleground between the two arguably largest actors in Europe; The European Union and the Russian 
Federation. What remains especially interesting at this point is not that they are seemingly struggling 
against each other, but why that struggle exists. What is also of interest is why this struggle seemingly has 
limited results despite, in varying degrees, having been in existence for more than a year. 
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Chapter 5: Analytical framework and operationalization 
Assembling the Ukrainian Crisis  
The above segment detailing the development of the Ukrainian crisis, from the Euromaidan to the 
annexation of Crimea and the War in Donbas is meant to offer context. It is meant to give a broad but still 
detailed account of what has occurred during the crisis, but also by whom and when. The overall purpose is 
to give a foundation of knowledge that will then be used to operationalize the theoretical framework of this 
paper. The following segment will deal with this operationalization directly. The theoretical framework of 
the English School will be applied to the actions of the involved actors, to see if it is possible to trace a 
pattern of action. Furthermore, some of the controversy regarding the crisis will also be looked at here.  
An Uncertain Present and Past Deceptions? 
Unfortunately, much like the first Minsk Protocol, the Minsk II Protocol does not appear to be overly 
effective at creating a ceasefire between the involved parties (Rettman 2015, telegraph.co.uk 2015, 
Mukhina 2015. Luhn 2015 and Zverev 2015).  Since the ceasefire, several confrontations have taken place, 
and many casualties inflicted. These are not solely linked to the Debaltseve case, but are rather spread out 
among several hotspots. Whether the Minsk II Protocol remains effective is up to debate, but a full 
ceasefire is not effectively in place (theguardian.com 2015 and Chernov 2015).   
In March of 2015, disconcerting, but not surprising news started to surface. A Russian made documentary 
named “Homeward Bound” was teased on Russian national television. In the teaser for the documentary, 
Putin is interviewed, and says that several days before gunmen took over the Crimean parliament, Putin 
had wanted to get Crimea back into the fold (news.yahoo 2015a, Elia 2015 and Shaw 2015). The statements 
from the Russian side of the crisis in early 2014 seem, in light of these developments, to have been a 
complete charade. The objective was always, it seems, to make Crimea Russian again.  
Much like the EU is sanctioning the pro-Russian parts of Russia, so too is it sanctioning the Russian 
Federation. The targeted sanctions are however, reciprocated from the Russian side. The Russian 
Federation has engaged in visa bans against officials from several countries such as the US as well as 
Canada (rt.com 2014i and Chase 2014). This tendency of implementing visa bans for Western officials does 
not stop with the US and Canada however. In May 2015, the Russian Federation released a blacklist of 89 
EU officials and politicians that are no longer allowed to travel to Russia (Onians 2015). The sanctions, much 
the European counterparts, do not stop with visa bans, but continue in to other more economically 
damaging areas. By a presidential executive order (en.kremlin.ru 2014c), Putin created a restriction on 
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certain agricultural products as well as raw materials and food from countries that have aimed sanctions at 
the Russian Federation (en.kremlin.ru 2014c, rt.com 2014j and bbc.com 2014g).      
The  ‘Little Green Men’ charade 
Putin, President of the Russian Federation, was quick to denounce any “rumours” of Russian involvement in 
the taking of Crimea (bbc.com 2014e, Borger 2014 and Taylor 2014: 93). Initially, Putin described these 
forces, the “green men” as simply being local self-defence groups, and that anyone who buys hardware and 
gear in a shop in Russia or Ukraine can look like Russian forces, but that they most definitely were not 
(bbc.com 2014e and Borger 2014).   
A few months later the tone changed drastically however, from total denial of any Russian involvement, to 
a complete 180 (rt.com 2014f). Even Putin himself seemed very comfortable admitting as much “Of course, 
the Russian servicemen did back the Crimean self-defence forces. They acted in a civil but a decisive 
and professional manner” (en.kremlin.ru 2014b). Apparently seeing no use in trying to keep the 
involvement a secret, a monument is even being built to honor the Russian armed forces involved in the 
taking and annexation of Crimea (themoscowtimes.com 2015). Ostensibly the point of having, and using, 
Russian Armed Forces in Crimea was to protect the population of Crimea against armed attacks by the 
stationed Ukrainian forces (rt.com 2014f).  
Rynning describes this charade, as simply an element in the Russian Federation’s new structure of conflict 
and use of force. A part of this charade, is a capacity that “involves deniable force in the shape of Russian 
special forces—Spetsnaz—dressed in unmarked uniforms. Their incognito appearance in Crimea ahead of 
annexation allowed President Putin to deny Russia’s formal involvement” (Rynning 2015: 544). This new 
capacity, as he describes, is not to enable any long term subterfuge, as no one ever believed the troops 
were not Russian, but simply to complicate a response, to muddy the waters so to speak (Rynning 2015: 
544).  
Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine – There and back again? 
A further point of contention between the involved parties is the alleged activity of Russian military 
personnel participating in these engagements between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatist forces 
(bbc.com 2014f, Urban 2015, atlanticcouncel.org 2015, dw.de 2015, Engel 2015 and news.vice.com 2015). 
Much like the beginning of the case of Crimea, Putin categorically denies any involvement of Russian troops 
in eastern Ukraine. No troops, no trainers, no specialists (rt.com 2014g, Aljazeera.com 2014a and bbc.com 
2014f).  
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The sources stating the involvement of the Russian Armed Forces however, are plentiful. The accusations 
span from the early days of the conflict in 2014, and have been common occurrences in the media since 
then. It does however, not seem to be idle comments, nor merely partisan comments meant to damage the 
Russian image in this conflict. Not only has Russian troops been captured in Ukraine on multiple occasions, 
such as paratroopers being captured in Ukraine by Ukrainian forces (bbc.com 2014f) or two injured Russian 
soldiers being caught behind enemy lines (Kramer 2015 and Balmforth and Polityuk 2015). Beyond the 
actual capturing of Russian military personnel, several initiatives have also been made in order to track 
Russian troops in Ukraine. One attempt made by Vice News (Vice News 2015) combined tracking photos 
from active Russian military personnel, from their own social networking sites, and tracking down the 
positions of those photographs. It was determined, and with no doubt on their part (news.vice.com 2015) 
that the person who took the photos was indeed an active Russian soldier, but also that several photos 
were taken in Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian civilians even corroborated the story at nearby villages to some 
of the photo sites (news.vice.com 2015). Much the same method is described by other outlets, in the case 
of the Atlantic Council, the process is described in detail, and is referred to as Digital Forensics 
(atlanticcouncil.com 2015: 8-14). Other sources describes that proof can be found in popular media, 
Russian social media, digital forensics of satellite pictures, but also official statements by the US and NATO 
(Urban 2015). Regardless if whatever proof described above (Baczynska 2015), if considered such by the 
Russian Federation , this is arguably a case of reasonable doubt when it comes to their denying any 
involvement. This is especially true in light of Crimea and the ‘little green men’.  
A matter of some concern, one that most outlets and experts agree on, is that there is a significant 
trafficking and sale of weapons from Russia to the pro-Russian separatists across the Russian-Ukrainian 
border (news.yahoo.com 2014b, Grove and Strobel 2014, Bender 2015, aljazeera.com 2014b). There is a 
general consensus that the Russian Federation is indeed providing arms to the pro-Russian separatists, and 
some even believe that this weapons import has doubled during the ceasefire period of the Minsk I 
Protocol (Bender 2015). The Russian Federation has its own version of events however, simply stating the 
arms the pro-Russian separatists are in possession of, are simply from old Soviet-era military bases, and as 
such has nothing to do with the Russian Federation (rt.com 2014k). The Russian Federation is however 
quick to point out, that in the event of the West supplying arms to the Ukrainian Government, Russia would 
feel the need to match that arms supply to the pro-Russian separatists (Norton-Taylor 2015).  
The EU and the Russian Federation, shared values?   
Looking at Buzan’s initial definitions of institutions and values, there is a certain degree of overflow. Though 
if one has to emphasize a difference between the two, it might be argued to be the degree of formalization. 
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While institutions will be dealt with in much greater detail in the following segments, values, in so far as 
they are separable will be considered here.   
Perhaps the most direct and useful way of looking at the values involved in the Ukrainian Crisis and its 
actors, is to look at their actions. Many of the arguments used, credibility aside, remain much the same. 
Humanitarianism, humanitarian intervention, sovereignty (Allison 2014: 1258) and so forth, but they say 
little about those values enshrined in their actions. The Russian Federation seemingly sets a specific value 
on its own sovereignty being of primary concern. Russian troops entered Crimea ostensibly to protect what 
they argued to be Russians, due to the fact that a certain percentage of Ukrainian Crimeans spoke Russian. 
A certain value was put not just in the primacy of Russian sovereignty over the sovereignty of Ukraine, but 
also a very steep value on the principle of Russian language. Despite the Westphalian conception of 
sovereignty, the Russian Federation believed that it had a legitimate claim to the Russian-speaking 
Ukrainian population, a claim they are also partially enforcing in Eastern Ukraine, and especially 
diplomatically. While a certain value is put on diplomacy, economy and restrictive measures, were 
effectively undercut in favour if a sense of Russian superiority over that of Ukraine. The value might be 
argued to be the very traditional case of Great Power privilege, in which the Russian Federation might see it 
as its right, by virtue of their value in a Great Power designation to interfere in its geographical hinterland. 
Overall, the Russian Federation seems to emphasise a clear value in the pluralistic understanding of society, 
but with a distinct Great Power twist (Stoner 2014: 83).  
The European Union seems to rely on a different set of values. There is a value put in many aspects of the 
diplomacy and non-violent means (McNamara 2014: 104). Specifically the EU continuously argues for a 
respect for Ukrainian sovereignty, internal law, diplomacy, peace and stability. Moreover, the EU does not 
seem to compromise on those values. The EU grants itself no Great Power status, not on its own, and 
seemingly not by virtue of its constituent Member States. While the Russian Federation was seemingly 
content to invade the Crimea peninsula when pro-EU government came to power in Kiev, the EU did not, 
and has not since, assisted the protesters of the Euromaidan by way of force. A value here is put on 
negotiation, common values and practices, especially in the form of integrative measures, the most direct 
of which is arguably the Association Agreement. The contrast seems to be obvious between the two actors: 
Where Russia will initially negotiate, if those negotiations fail, the Russian Federation will back up its 
perceived claims with might (Krastev 2014: 79). The EU puts a value on, ironic though it may sound, on 
common values, norms and practices. As such the EU has primarily involved itself in Ukraine by way of 
reform advice as well as economic and diplomatic measures. That is not to say that the EU will not apply 
direct pressure, but only that it does so by way of economics and diplomacy as opposed to force.    
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Patterns of interaction – the EU 
The above contextual framework has set the stage for the theoretical application of the English School by 
Bull and Buzan. Initially the aim is to use the institutions and societal archetypes described in Bull and 
Buzan’s works, in order to get an idea of what kinds of society the EU and Russia constitutes. Not from a 
perspective of what they themselves might believe, but rather from the perspective of their actions. 
Actions speak louder than words, seems an apt saying in this regard. This endeavour will initially be 
attempted in regards to the actions of the European Union in the Ukrainian crisis.  
The EU has been deeply involved in the Ukraine crisis. Their involvement greatly differs from that of the 
other actors in the crisis however. While the Russian Federation will be covered in depth below, it will come 
as no great surprise that its approach had been rather more ‘hands on’ than that of the EU.  The 
involvement of the EU arguably takes on more than one single aspect in the crisis. In terms of political 
involvement, the EU has, as specified in the past section on the more contextual segment of the analysis. 
Buzan specifically chalks up 6 different societal arch types, each with their own indicators and at times 
different accepted institutions. However, exiting on a spectrum means that there is also a certain degree of 
bleed-through from one type of society to the previous and/or the following type. In terms of the more 
pro-Ukrainian political involvement, the EU has not only full on supported the post-Euromaidan Ukrainian 
Government, but also the protesters before that. Their involvement in this sphere also extends to helping 
the new Ukrainian Government set up arrangements with international banking institutions, and 
arrangements with Member States of the EU. This specific kind of interaction leans heavily away from the 
almost fictional asocial type of society that Buzan presents. This is not a case of extermination with no soft 
measures. What has been done in Ukraine in terms of pro-Ukrainian efforts, has in fact been almost 
exclusively the softer measures of support for the efforts of the Ukrainian Government. This is the case for 
both the political actions of reform that the Ukrainian Government has taken, but also for their willingness 
to pursue non-violent paths to peace, though maybe not reconciliation. The EU involvement in the pro-
Ukrainian political arena also seems far from the power political society, were the softer institutions such as 
diplomacy and humanitarianism and international law. Power political would lean more towards non-
intervention, sovereignty and perhaps alliance making, but rarely much more than that, as a predominantly 
pluralist societal arch type. In terms of the institutions at play, the coexistence type of interstate society 
seems a much tighter fit. It acknowledges balance of power, sovereignty, territoriality, great power 
management, war and international law. Specifically the EU has been firm on the principles of sovereignty, 
territoriality, diplomacy and international law. However, the EU has vehemently distanced itself from war, 
death and military actions.  
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Instead of sending armament, troops or trainers to the Ukrainian Government, the EU has instead 
emphasized a more humanitarian, stability and reform oriented approach. Not only has the EU offered 
loans to the Ukrainian Government, in order for the economic stability of the country to remain, but it has 
also specifically invested in financial aid aimed at helping humanitarian projects in Ukraine. The largest part 
of the economic initiative of the EU to the Ukrainian Government is most likely the Association Agreement, 
as it promotes economic integration and growth in Ukraine, by creating access to the EU market and 
investment possibilities.  
The EU has in fact not only provided political and economic support to the new Ukrainian Government, it 
has also systemically tried to assist in keeping the fleeting peace in Ukraine by contributing to the OSCE 
monitoring mission, reiterated their willingness to help with elections, peace talks, advice for reform as well 
as for their implementation. The main focus of the EU it seems, has primarily been to stabilize Ukraine and 
help it recover, albeit in a direction converging with EU values. In fact, where the overt political agenda 
seems more coexistence oriented, the diplomacy exhibited leans more closely towards a cooperative 
societal model, one in which war might be argued to no longer validly exist. Despite threats of retaliation 
towards the pro-Russian separatists and the Russian Federation, this retaliation has never been of a military 
nature, neither in action, nor in words. Bull would argue this demise of ‘war as an institution’, and the 
introduction of human rights to be symptomatic of the pluralism-plus model, one in which a stable society 
has already been achieved. However that is hardly the case here, due to the nature of the actors and the 
conflict they are participating in. While the Ukrainian crisis is in no way a proxy-war, there is a distinct case 
of the EU and the Russian Federation having picked their sides, and seemingly supplying support. The EU’s 
agenda ostensibly seems to be territorial integrity and sovereignty of the new Ukrainian Government, a 
new government leaning towards the EU and its norms, values and institutions. Perhaps the most obvious 
example of this is the Association Agreement that has been negotiated, signed and partially implemented 
since the start of the Ukrainian crisis. The Association Agreement, which as mentioned previously, is 
centred on political association and economic integration, but also cores areas such as values, foreign and 
security policy, justice and several other areas. In effect, the Association Agreement aims at converging 
aspects of Ukrainian policy and laws to that of the EU’s own policies and laws. The word “converging” is 
central here, as it arguably fits into the convergence oriented societal model that Buzan describes; a model 
wherein states actively models themselves on values and norms. While Ukraine can hardly be argued to 
generally converge with EU norms and values at present, it has made an effort to fall in line with the wishes 
of the EU, and the diplomatic talks such as the Minsk I and II Protocol.       
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This however does not mean that the EU has been shy from getting more aggressively involved in the 
Ukrainian crisis. Instead of taking a solely diplomatic or normative approach to the conflict, the EU has, as 
rigorously shown in the contextual analysis been willing to influence matters more directly.  
 A large part of the more politically and economically oriented involvement of the EU, has been with the 
political statements as well as restrictive measures against Russia and the Ukrainian pro-Russian separatist. 
Politically, the EU has condemned the Russian Federations involvement in the Ukrainian Crisis, not only 
their apparent support and involvement with the pro-Russian separatist, but especially the annexation of 
Crimea. The official opinion of the EU is that not only was the referendum made in the Crimean Parliament 
illegal and illegitimate, but the circumstances were highly suspicious and openly critiqued. Closed doors, 
armed guards in Parliament and as well as the unconstitutional nature of the election itself made the EU 
condemn it as illegal. Compounding this is the later referendum that voted for accession of Crimea to the 
Russian Federation, a referendum that the Russian Federation accepted, in effect annexing the Crimean 
peninsula. This annexation also resulted in some of the most direct and aggressive actions taken by the EU 
in the Ukrainian crisis. Following the annexation, the EU launched numerous restrictive measures, in the 
form of economic sanctions against Crimea, Sevastopol and Russia. These sanctions target everything from 
investments, provisions, import and export bans and prohibitions in Crimea and Sevastopol. It also includes 
asset freezes as well as visa bans of certain people from that regions, as well as people having benefited of 
the Russian annexation (eeas.europa.eu 2015b: pp. 106-115). More directly however, the EU, its nationals 
and the companies based in the EU are no longer permitted to “buy or sell new bonds, equity or similar 
financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days” (europa.eu 2015b) from several Russian sources, 
such as Russian banks and their subsidiaries, energy companies, defence companies. Furthermore, the list 
of military goods and dual use goods are not allowed to be traded to the Russian Federation, Crimea or 
Sevastopol. This is compounded by a ban on financial instruments, some energy related equipment and 
services for oil exploration of different types (europa.eu 2015b).  
Arguably the sanctions by the EU against Crimea and Sevastopol are even more severe, with heavy import 
and export bans of most kinds and a policy of non-recognition. Almost nothing made in Crimea or 
Sevastopol is imported by the EU, and almost nothing made, be it services or resources are exported to 
Crimea and Sevastopol.  
Despite these relatively heavy sanctions, and political agenda of a stabilized, territorially independent and 
pro-EU Ukraine agenda, the EU has not resorted to military force. Arguably there are several reasons for 
this, the primary of which is that the EU has very few actual military capabilities on its own. Beyond that 
however, the constellation of the EU is more geared towards a convergence or perhaps even lightly a 
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confederative societal model. These are societal models where war is not actually considered a valid 
institution (Freeman, Farmer and Parfitt 2015, Parfitt and Huggler 2015 and bbc.com 2015c). As such 
whatever actions taken by the EU, will seemingly not be of a military nature3, but rather of a humanitarian, 
political, diplomatic or economic nature.  
Looking at the initial analysis of the EU in an English School light, there are strong indicators for the EU, not 
just by virtue of its statements, but also its actions, that it represents a societal model with an emphasis on 
cooperation and convergence. There is a distinct respect and emphasis on sovereignty, territoriality, non-
intervention and self-determination, many of the basic institutions found in any pluralist or solidarist 
societal type. However, the EU seems to also include some other less common institutions such as 
international law, human rights and especially diplomacy; these institutions a greater in concentration on 
the solidarist side of the spectrum. More important than inclusion in this case, might be exclusions. The EU 
seems to not only talk the talk, but also walk the walk in terms of war as a legitimate institution. Not only 
does this indicate that the EU is a more cooperative and convergence oriented society, but also that it falls 
firmly on the solidarist half of the societal type spectrum. It seems to fulfil both Bulls definition of a 
solidarist society in that it promotes the economic and social interaction between states and actors. While 
Bull and Buzan both argue that it is rarely, if ever, a completely purist type of actor, they both do 
acknowledge that state might change their position on the spectrum, depending on the circumstances they 
find themselves in. An example could be the reintroduction of war as a legitimate institution in times of 
conflict, however this does not seem to be the case for the EU in the current conflict. Despite the Russian 
Federation’s involvement in Ukraine as well as the manner of its involvement, the EU still does not see war 
in armed conflict as a legitimate institution, further solidifying its solidarist position.  
While the EU has acted exactly as it has stated it would. Diplomacy, political and economic support, even 
restrictive measures, it is also limited by what it can feasibly do. The EU is by default an economic giant, and 
its Member States comprise the majority of the developed Western countries. As such, it makes sense to 
play to its strengths, namely economics. The issue is seemingly that if a situation does arise, where military, 
physical, tangible power is required, the EU does not have the capability, nor apparently accepts war as an 
institution regardless of capabilities. Under the current circumstances in Ukraine, if push comes to shove, 
the EU cannot physically ‘push’ back against the pro-Russian separatists or potentially Russia itself.  
                                                          
3
 This however does not preclude actions my Member States on other mandates, though this has not been the case as 
of yet. 
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Patterns of Interaction – the Russian Federation 
Quite like with the European Union above, this segment will focus on the societal profile of the Russian 
Federation. Again, this will not be done from their own presentation of their national profile, but instead by 
looking at the actions, or in the case of the Russian Federation in Ukraine – Alleged actions. The actions that 
have been taken will help illustrate what kind of societal archetype that the Russian Federation seemingly 
inhabits under these specific circumstances.  
Much the same as with the EU, the actions of the Russian Federation does not match that of the asocial 
archetype. It is a somewhat fabricated extreme on the pluralistic side of the spectrum, denoting values that 
were arguably only seen to a small degree under the Second World War. The power political societal 
approach is one based on the survival of oneself. In this case, the survival of Russia could be argued to be a 
central consideration. One could argue for other more solidaristic societal types, had the Russian 
Federation simply accepted the Crimean vote for independence and left it at that. However the situation is 
quite different, with Crimea going from an autonomous Ukrainian region, to a federal region of the Russian 
Federation, an annexation as it is argued. With this having happened, it arguably makes the idea of the 
Russian Federation supporting the independence claims of the Donbass region out of some sense of social 
and political justice somewhat naïve. The Russian Federation has shown with Crimea that not only will it lie 
about its intentions, but also about their willingness to use military force to achieve their goals, despite 
condemnation from the EU, but more importantly the United Nations General Assembly (un.org 2014). 
While the more or less fictive asocial pluralist societal archetype is not a fit, nor does any of the more 
solidarist societal models fit the actions of the Russian Federation. From the perspective of English School 
institutions, be Bull’s traditional institutions or Buzan’s never conceptions of them, the Russian Federation 
does not seem to value or recognize a lot of the same institutions that the EU does. It seems to recognize 
war and diplomacy as valid institutions, but the actions of the Russian Federation seems to indicate that 
sovereignty, territoriality, boundaries and self-determination are expendable when it comes to Ukraine.    
What is central in this case is not so much that supporting one faction over another is wrong, nothing so 
normative. However, the UN having reaffirmed the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine over Crimea makes 
arguably makes its accession to, an annexation of the Russian Federation illegal, much like the EU has 
claimed since early 2014. The Russian willingness to cross into Ukrainian sovereign territory, seemingly 
whenever it feels the need, or in the case of Crimea permanently, voids any illusion that the Russian 
Federation respects of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territoriality.  
The institution of diplomacy deserves mention in regards to the Russian Federation. While it can be argued 
that the Russia only enters diplomacy and negotiations when it benefits the Russia, it is none the less an 
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important actor in the multilateral peace talks in Ukraine. Despite ignoring complaints about Crimea, and 
showing a categorical denial of any unlawful behaviour in terms of Crimea, the Russian Federation has been 
an integral part of both the Minsk I Protocol, and the subsequent Minsk II Protocol. Both of which were 
meant to create a ceasefire. However, while this might constitute a degree of cooperation,  or coexistence 
at the very least, as well as diplomacy or even alliance making with the pro-Russian separatists, it still 
means very little in light of Crimea, the deception around Crimea, but also its initial and seemingly 
continued breach of Ukrainian sovereignty.  
The most aggressive actions the EU have taken, are arguably the targeted sanctions against Crimea and 
Sevastopol, but more importantly against Russia. Those actions however, have been reciprocated by the 
Russian Federation against the EU.  
Furthermore, the Russian Federation is widely believed to supply the pro-Russian separatists with military 
equipment, such as weapons, gear and tanks. This has, despite the general consensus, been completely 
denied by the Russian Federation, who simply believes that they pro-Russian separatists can get the clothes 
and gear themselves, and that anything else that they have, be it vehicles or weapons have been liberated 
from Ukrainian or old Soviet bases.  
While it might be argued that in terms of sanctions, the situation between the EU and the Russian 
Federation, is one of ‘tit for tat’, that is not the limit of Russian involvement, and far from the most 
aggressive. The primary involvement for the Russian Federation in Ukraine has beyond a doubt been its 
annexation of Crimea. Much like weapons and military equipment, Russian officials denied any involvement 
in Crimea. They denied having troops helping the separatists, and denied any accusations that the election 
had by no means been a fair one in Crimea. However, denying its involvement in Crimea only lasted a 
couple of months, before Putin admitted that they had indeed sent troops to capture most Ukrainian 
military installations, and furthermore, that Putin and his advisors had prepared to take back Crimea even 
before the election. Now with what many would call proof, Russia seems to be participating actively in 
Eastern Ukraine on the side of the pro-Russian separatists. It is already apparent that the Russian 
Federation supports the self-proclaimed Donestk and Luhansk in the Donbass region, and now there are 
very strong indications that Russia is indeed helping them keep their independence in the form of troops, 
arms and armour.  
Certain aspects of this could be argued in an English School light to constitute the support of institutions 
such as alliance making, diplomacy, even self-determination and democracy. From a Russian perspective 
this might constitute a form of cooperation-based societal model. However, it is also apparent that the 
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Russian Federation systematically eschews any form of rights for Ukraine. With most of the Western world 
calling the annexation of Crimea illegal and illegitimate, and even the UN General Assembly reaffirming 
Ukraine’s territoriality, one can hardly argue that the Russian Federation follows the institutions of non-
intervention, boundaries, and international law. Even the points above were there could be argued for a 
cooperation based societal approach to the Donbass region, it seems to fall flat in light of what happened in 
Crimea. Any institution point towards cooperation with the Donbass region, calls for a complete lack of the 
same with Ukraine. The indication is instead one that is heavily emphasising a power political approach to 
society, one focused on power maximizing and physical, tangible power and war as fully valid institutions.    
The Russian Federations actions are partially a case of perspectives in terms of certain institutions, but it is 
obvious that Russia does not value or accept the same institutions as the EU, at the very least, not to the 
same degree. Moreover, the Russian Federation is exhibiting a strong belief in the institution of war and 
power politics, one not shared with the EU. Overall, and in spite of certain coexistence and cooperative 
elements of Russian society, it arguably falls primarily into the more traditional Westphalian power political 
societal archetype. Unlike the EU it firmly seems to have a pluralistic and thus more traditional Hobbesian 
perspective on what values and institutions count.  
This means several things. Where one can seemingly count on the EU doing what it says, such as its 
increasing sanctions and Ukrainian support, it only has a limited amount of tools due to its firm solidaristic 
position. The Russian Federation is not bound by the same rules that the EU has accepted or imposed on 
themselves, and as such can readily make use of its military to dictate or influence events. It means that 
their capabilities are broader, and some would argue more immediately effect than the EU sanction regime, 
one that Russia is also attempting to reciprocate. The Russian Federation can fight with the same proverbial 
weapons that the EU employs, but its societal view is such that they can also employ weapons of the non 
proverbial type. This is something that the EU is not willing to do, neither in speech nor in action. However, 
where the Russian Federation arguably gains in capabilities, it loses in credibility. Following its straight up 
deception around the situation in Crimea, there is arguably reasonable doubt when it comes to Russian 
intentions, but also in terms of whatever trust one can put in their statements or diplomacy. This doubt is 
easily seen in the multitude of articles and comments on what is perceived as a deeply involved Russian 
Federation. It is widely believed that the Russian Federation is supporting the pro-Russian separatists with 
almost any means. Articles on weapons, gear and vehicles is a large part of what belief and critique, but 
perhaps most importantly are the accusation that Russia is in fact systematically using its own armed forces 
to counter the Ukrainian Governments armed forces. If this is true, than the Russian Federation is not 
simply supporting the pro-Russian separatists, they are in fact fighting their conflict for them, much like the 
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‘little green men’ in Crimea. Crimea in this sense remains the crux of the problem, as the Russian credibility 
is arguably non-existent in the face of the Crimean deception. And with all their following involvement in 
the Ukrainian crisis, specifically the war in Donbass, the intentions of the Russian activities are very much in 
doubt, and reasonably so.  
The European Union and the Russian Federation: a clash of societies? 
This last segment of the theoretical analysis will deal specifically with the disparity that seems to exist 
between the EU and the Russian Federation and their values and institutions. What will be looked at is 
what the result of those disparities between the two actors is, and how this has challenged the agendas of 
those actors in the Ukrainian crisis.  
A clash of values and institutions 
Originally the Russian Federation was not really in competition with the EU, rather it was NATO that it 
disliked.  “EU enlargement is generally perceived in Russia as positive. In contrast to NATO’s eastern 
expansion, Russian politicians and the public accept the rapprochement of the form soviet bloc countries to 
the EU” (Bordachev 2001: 50). While there was early on a focus on the problematic of Ukraine’s minorities 
and majorities (Berg and Meuers 2001: 134) there was still an emphasis on the role that a stable Ukraine 
could fill in EU economics (Voznyak 2001: 206). Despite this emphasis and recognition of Ukraine’s 
potential, Ukraine has plenty of complications such as a falling GDP and a slow reform process. This 
seemingly changed after the Orange Revolution where Yanukovych was forced to step down after 
allegations of election fraud. Wilson argues the reason for the Russian Federation, and Putin’s actions are 
mired in a Russian persecution complex: 
 “Russia’s action was really Putin’s action, but it was also the product of Russia’s addiction to dangerous 
myths – myths which, at some point the in 1990’s, the world stopped correction: That Russia had been 
‘humiliated’; that the former USSR was the ‘lost territory’ of historical Russia; that Russia’s historic fear of 
encirclement was replaying itself because of NATO expansion” (Wilson 2014: vii) 
 During the crisis, the Russian Federation has increased its aggressive rhetoric and threats such as the 
threat to use nuclear weapons if Denmark joins the NATO defence shield (Withnall 2015). Another example, 
by President Poroshenko is that President Putin threatened that he could put Russian troops in several 
eastern European capitals in days, one being Warsaw. A close parallel by previous EU Commission President 
Barroso, who Putin boasted that he could take Kiev, the Ukrainian capital in only two weeks (Huggler 2014 
and Stewart 2014). In 2013, Danish F-16 fighter jets had to escort Russian bombers and escort fighters out 
of Swedish airspace where they were practicing strategic bombings over the Stockholm area, Sweden’s 
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capital (Boserup 2013). Aerial incursions by the Russian Federation in Europe are increasingly common, 
with more than 100 Russian military aircraft being escorted out of non-Russian airspace in 2014 
(euronews.com 2015). While the validity of President Poroshenko and then-President Barroso can be called 
into question as there is no formal proof, other statements were made by Russian officials, the planes and 
the Russian military submersible in Sweden (Groll 2014), as well as the frequent escorts of Russian military 
planes are harder to dismiss. While there is hardly any reason to believe that the Russian Federation has 
any intention to bomb Stockholm, or use nuclear weaponry against the Danish navy, the reality remains 
that the Russian Federation obviously has a very different perspective on the threat and use of force, than 
the EU does.      
While the Russia of the early millennium seemed content with the EU stabilization process in the Russian 
neighbourhood, it none the less ended in conflict with a pro-EU Georgian regime in 2008 (Wilson 2014: 2).  
Now short years after the Georgian conflict, Russia stands in conflict with a pro-EU Ukraine: a conflict that 
is still ongoing, and extremely costly.  
The agendas of the EU and the Russian Federation have arguably been complete opposites in the Ukrainian 
Crisis. The EU has called for the respect and protection of international law and Ukrainian sovereignty and 
territoriality. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation has argued for the protection of Russian minorities and 
the right for self-determination of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. While the EU has allied itself with the post-
Yanukovych Ukrainian Government, the Russian Federation has allied itself with the Russian minorities and 
pro-Russian separatists, and perhaps in particular, it own national interests. The Association Agreement 
and the sanctions against the Donbass region, Crimea, Sevastopol and the Russian Federation best 
exemplify the EU’s commitment to Ukraine. The Russian Federation’s commitment can be seen in its fierce 
support of pro-Russian separatists, seemingly both in the tangible and non-tangible sense, but especially in 
its complete annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as its sanctions against the EU.  
The EU’s agenda seems quite straightforward: to uphold Ukrainian sovereignty, especially in Eastern 
Ukraine and Crimea, to dissuade the Russian Federation from assisting the pro-Russian separatist, to help 
Ukraine transition into a more EU-leaning country and specifically to remove the Russian Federation from 
the Crimean peninsula.  
The Russian Federations agenda seems a bit broader however, especially due to its deceit relating to 
Crimea. Russia initially wanted a pro-Russian Ukrainian Government, in the form of Yanukovych, whom it 
could count on to join its Eurasian Union. In lieu of this, the Russian Federation seemingly wanted to 
destabilize a pro-EU Ukrainian Government, and has seemingly achieved this. The Russian Federation has 
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been a part of all the major negotiations, has supported the pro-Russian separatist greatly, and has full on 
annexed part of Ukraine. Whether the Russian Federation aims for occupy more of Ukraine under the 
flimsy pretext of democratic secession is as of yet unknown, but the modus operandi of the Crimean 
annexation seems a distinct possibility for the self-proclaimed and Russian supported Donetsk and Luhansk 
Oblasts.  
The Russian Federations agenda was seemingly initially to have a pliant pro-Russian neighbour, one that 
could join and help legitimize the upcoming Eurasian Union. That was before the crisis however, and the 
agenda as described above, changed drastically. The brunt of the EU or Western sanctioning of the Russian 
Federation however, was ostensibly meant to force Russia to reconsider its policy choices in annexing 
Crimea and Sevastopol. The Russian Federation’s initial agenda failed completely when Yankukovych was 
ousted, and a pro-EU interim and later elected Ukrainian Government came to power following the 
Euromaidan.  
Russia has arguably made some headway in its apparent agenda of destabilizing Ukraine and making a land 
grab for Crimea and Sevastopol, an agenda that seems to emphasize a power maximizing effort for the 
Russian Federation. The EU’s sanction agenda was quite simply however: get the Russian Federation out of 
Crimea and Sevastopol, but seems to have garnered little if any result. The argument has been made that 
the sanctions have made it harder for Russia to move on, that it might have curtailed Russian ambition, 
which while also part of the agenda, is not the primary goal of restoring Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. In 
fact, despite several rounds of increasingly hard sanctions, Russia is still very much present in Ukraine, and 
continues to support the pro-Russian separatists. In case of Crimea, it is also debated, if annexing it, will 
actually turn into a gain for Russia (Motyl 2014: 101). 
The question must remain: why does the EU’s attempt at influencing Russian policy in Ukraine not work? 
The prevailing theoretical argument seems to be quite simple. The Russian Federation, with its power 
political focus and full recognition of war and armed response as a legitimate institution, and thus 
capability is fundamentally limiting the EU’s ability to counter the Russian Federation in the short-term. The 
EU is both structurally unable, and institutionally unwilling to counter the Russian Federation by force of 
arms. Wilson seemingly agrees, stating that “Putin thought that Europe was too comfortable and too 
prosperous, even after the Great Recession, and was so unused to sacrifice that it was incapable of 
addressing (or even understanding) old fashioned hard power” (Wilson 2014: viii). The very same notion 
was partially reaffirmed by Putin himself when he stated that: “As for the power factor in international 
relations, it has always existed and will always exist“(en.kremlin.ru 2014b), a power factor that Putin and 
the Russian Federation seems to have been comfortable using in Ukraine. While Herman Van Rompuy, 
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then-President of the European Council lamented that “The world will never be as before” (Wilson 2014: 1), 
the outcome does not seem to could have turned out any other way.  
From and English School, pluralist/solidarist perspective, the EU was simply not geared or equipped to 
handle the degree of physical confrontation that the Russian Federation was willing to dish out in the short-
term. The types of society, institutions and values that the two actors embody have seemingly created a 
situation where the EU cannot directly counter Russian aggression and expansionism. While there is 
absolutely no saying what the long-term consequences of the sanctions will be for Russia, in the short to 
medium term, Crimea remains part of the federal Russian state, and Russia does not seem likely to 
abandon Eastern Ukraine yet. This is in spite of what some believe to be an expensive gambit, with an 
annexation of Crimea that is liable to cost the Russian Federation heavily (Motyl 2014: 101) and a loss of 
foreign investement for Russia (Treisman 2014: 89).   
 Bull defines a system of states as a system wherein the involved countries are sharing the same sets of 
rules when dealing with each other. Yet the Russian Federation and the European Union seemingly do not 
follow the same set of rules. The Russian Federation firmly seems to be acting in a more pluralistic system-
based setting, as opposed to an EU that seems to exemplify a solidarist society.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to look at the interactions of the European Union and the Russian Federation, 
and whether or not the agenda’s of those actors have borne fruit. Determining and categorising those 
actions was the first step in allowing for the English School theoretical framework to be operationalized. 
The operationalization meant that the theoretical concepts of English School theory could be employed on 
the events of the Ukrainian Crisis, in order to determine the societal archetypes of the European Union and 
the Russian Federation.   
The paper takes its point of departure in the events leading to the Euromaidan, and fundamentally ends in 
the present, in a still uncertain and active conflict in Ukraine. The operationalization of this period of time, 
and the events and actions it contains, allows for the determination and constellation of institutions and 
values of the two primary external actors, the European Union and the Russian Federation. It was 
determined by looking at their actions what values and institutions that seemed to be embedded in the 
actors, and thus determine their societal archetypes.  
The European Union, with its emphasis on non-violence, peaceful solutions, as well as a strong diplomacy 
and an adherence to the principles of international law, is seen as a strong solidaristic societal archetype. 
Specifically it is argued to fall within the convergence societal archetype, whereby a convergence of 
interests, values and policies takes place. An example of this is the Association Agreement, which promotes 
a convergence of Ukrainian and European Union values. The European Union also employed aggressive 
economic diplomacy, in the form of sanctions, in order to influence the policies of the Russian Federation. 
The Russian Federation meanwhile, represented a far more pluralistic societal archetype. One in which 
alliance making and diplomacy were parts of the Russia policy equation, but overshadowed by its active 
military involvement in the conflict. While the scope is in question, there is little doubt about a direct 
Russian involvement in the events of the Donbass region. More importantly, the deception around Russian 
deployments on the Crimean peninsula, and the subsequent annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol severely 
weakens the Russian Federations credibility. This is especially true regarding their statements on Russian 
troops, material and support in Eastern Ukraine. From the actions of the Russian Federation, it was 
determined to primarily be a power political societal archetype, one closely resembling the traditional 
Westphalian tradition.   
These fundamentally different societal archetypes meant that any influence of Russian policy by the 
European Union was doubtful in the short-term. Seemingly nothing less than boots on the ground, could 
counter the pluralistic oriented Russian Federation in the short-term. While the effects on the Russian 
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Federations economy, world standing and civil population can be debated on the medium to long term, 
there seems little indication that the sanctions of the European Union has severely impacted the Russian 
Federations policy on Ukraine, Crimea and the pro-Russian separatists. At the very least, the Russian 
Federation is still in full possession of the Crimean peninsula, present at the negation table in matters of 
the Ukrainian Crisis, and still in support of the self-proclaimed independent republics of Donetsk and 
Luhansk. The European Union’s agenda of maintaining and protecting Ukrainian sovereignty on the 
Crimean peninsula and in eastern Ukraine, has seemingly failed in the short-term, despite a heavy regime 
of sanctions. The credibility of the European Union has arguably fallen, as it turns out not to have the 
necessary capabilities to handle actors the size of the Russian Federation, and its legitimization of violence 
and coercion as diplomatic tools.           
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